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Counterfactual thinking is the comparison of a factual situation to a 
simulated alternative one. When people think about how things could have 
been different, they tend to mentally undo the last occurrence in an 
independent sequence of antecedents to an outcome. We report two 
experiments that examined this phenomenon that has been called the 
temporal order effect. The first experiment, with 132 participants, examined 
the effect of varying the number of everyday life events on the temporal 
order effect. The results show that, in mundane situations, the effect occurs 
only when the outcome is preceded by a sufficient number of events. The 
second experiment, with 177 participants, examined a possible interaction of 
the temporal order effect with a different mutability effect - the tendency to 
change controllable events that are exceptional with regards to interpersonal 
norms for behaviour. The results show that the mutability of these 
exceptional events is influenced by their position in an independent 
temporal sequence. We discuss the results in terms of social norms. 
 
Counterfactual “if only” thoughts about what might have been involve 
the mental comparison of an actual situation with a simulated alternative. 
They have been studied both by philosophers (e.g., Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 
1968) and psychologists (e.g., Byrne, 1997; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; 
Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Counterfactual thinking has been shown to play 
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a role in many cognitive processes such as causal judgements (e.g., Roese & 
Olson, 1997), deductive reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and 
creativity (e.g., Hofstadter, 1985). Counterfactual thinking has also been 
shown to have a range of affective consequences. It has, for example, been 
shown to influence feelings of regret and elation (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 
1994; Landman, 1987). Negative emotions, such as regret, can be spawned 
by upward counterfactual thoughts, where people compare the factual 
situation to a better alternative (e.g., Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 1995). 
Infrequently, positive emotions may instead result from downward 
counterfactual thinking, where people compare reality to a worse 
alternative. Both kinds of counterfactual thinking may have both functional 
and dysfunctional consequences (e.g., Roese, 1994; Sherman & McConnell, 
1996). 
When people imagine how things would or might have been different, 
they tend to focus on particular sorts of events to mentally undo in their 
construction of alternatives. They tend to focus on actions rather than 
failures to act (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), at least in a short-term  (Byrne 
& McEleney, 1997; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). They focus on exceptional 
rather than routine events (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), dynamic rather than 
static events (Kahneman and Varey, 1990), and controllable rather than 
uncontrollable events (Girotto, Legrenzi & Rizzo, 1991). The focus of 
people’s counterfactual thoughts also tends to be influenced by the order in 
which the information is presented to them. On the one hand, people tend to 
undo the first even of a causal chain and this tendency has been called the 
causal primacy effect (Wells, Taylor and Turtle, 1987). On the other hand, 
they tend to undo the last event of a independent temporal sequence, and 
this tendency has been called the temporal order effect (Miller & 
Gunasegaram, 1990). The main aim of this paper is to examine the temporal 
order effect more closely. The other aim was to examine how some of these 
different factors interact in determining the mutability of an event. 
 
TEMPORAL ORDER  EFFECT IN COUNTERFACTUAL 
THINKING 
The temporal order effect was first explored by Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) who gave their participants a sequence of two letters: xf. When they 
asked people to quickly change one letter, their participants tended to 
change the second letter in the sequence rather than the first. That implies 
that they found the second letter easier to undo. Similarly, Miller & 
Gunasegaram (1990) offered their participants the following scenario:  
Imagine two individuals (Jones and Cooper) who are offered the 
following very attractive proposition. Each individual is asked to toss Counterfactuals and temporality effect 
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a coin. If the two coins come up the same (both heads and both tails) 
each individual wins £1,000. However, if the two coins do not come 
up the same, neither individual wins anything. Jones goes first and 
tosses a head; Cooper goes next and tosses a tail. Thus, the outcome is 
that neither individual wins anything.  
 
Most people judged that the outcome could most readily have been 
different if Cooper (who acted second) had tossed a head, rather than if 
Jones (who acted first) had tossed a tail. They also tended to judge that 
Cooper would experience more guilt, and would be blamed more by Jones 
(e.g., Byrne, Segura, Culhane, Tasso & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & 
Gunasegaram, 1990;). 
Byrne et al. (2000) have examined this phenomenon in a series of 
studies. Their experiments showed that the temporal order effect arises 
independently of strong preconceptions about normal descriptive order (e.g. 
heads and tails on a coin). When Byrne et al. changed game show scenarios 
like that used by Miller and Gunasegaram (1990),  to use choices with no 
strong linguistic preconceptions (e.g., the participants in a game show must 
pick the same coloured card  - red or black - from two separate decks in 
order to win), they continued to find a temporal order effect. In their 
experiments, they also showed that the temporal order effect depends on the 
order of events in the world, regardless of the order of events in the 
description occurs. When participants are offered scenarios like the one 
described above but in which the second individual is mentioned first (e.g. 
second individual picks a red card, before him the first individual gets a 
black card), people still tend to undo the actions of the person who acted 
second.  
The cognitive mechanisms than underlie the temporal order effect can 
be explained in terms of the construction of counterfactual alternatives by 
revising mental models of the factual situation (Byrne, 1997; Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 1991). For example, people construct the following sort of 
representation of the coin-toss scenario: 
  jones -heads    cooper –tails 
where 'jones-heads' represents that Jones tossed a head, and 'cooper-
tails' represents that Cooper tossed a tail (Byrne et al., 2000). When they 
must think of ways in which the outcome could have been different they 
may flesh out the counterfactual possibilities to be fully explicit: 
 
factual:      jones -heads    cooper  -tails             
lose   S. Segura & R. McCloy 
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counterfactual:   jones -heads    cooper -heads   win   
   jones-tails   cooper-tails   win 
   jones  -tails   cooper  -heads   lose 
 
Different possibilities are represented on different lines, and the 
models are tagged to keep track of their epistemic status. As for other 
domains, due to the constraints of working memory, people fail to find 
counterexamples to the conclusions that they derive from their initial 
models (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, 1991). Likewise, the temporal order effect 
indicates that people only flesh-out their counterfactual models to contain 
one other possibility: 
 
 
factual:      jones -heads    cooper  -tails    
  lose  
counterfactual:   jones -heads    cooper -heads   win  
                             
The nature of counterfactual representations that people construct is 
defined by the fact that people make minimal changes to the factual events 
(Lewis, 1973; Pollock, 1986; Stalnaker, 1968), and that they are also more 
likely to delete an event than to add one (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Roese, 1994). On the other hand, 
counterfactual thinking is a goal-driven process, and therefore, in failure 
situations such as the one described in this scenario, people tend to represent 
how things might have been better (Roese & Olson, 1997). Consequently, 
the first model they flesh out is one in which both individuals win. But, why 
do people change the second event? The earlier event is presupposed 
because it contextualises the model, providing a cornerstone or anchor for 
the subsequent construction of models (Byrne et al., 2000; Segura, 
Fernandez-Berrocal & Byrne, 1998, 2000).  
The anchoring process is evident in the “anchoring heuristic” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). People sometimes reduce ambiguity by 
starting with a beginning reference point or anchor and then they adjust the 
rest of information they receive in the light of it. For example, when people 
who are asked to play the role of a judge are given instructions about giving 
the harshest verdict first, they render significantly harsher verdicts then 
those ones who were instructed to consider lenient verdicts first (Greenberg, 
Williams & O´Brien, 1986). Similarly, the mentioned results (Byrne et al., 
2000) suggest that the temporal order effect can arise because people Counterfactuals and temporality effect 
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presuppose the first event and, therefore, they tend to mentally undo the 
second one.  
This tendency has been suggested to play a role in everyday 
judgements such as the tendency for blackjack players to be averse to 
playing on the last box, for teams to put their faster runner last in a relay 
race, and for people to bet more on their predictions and their postdictions 
(Miller and Gunasegaram , 1990; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). Our aim in 
these experiments is to examine the temporal order effect more closely in 
everyday life situations in order to explore some of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying counterfactual thinking.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
THE TEMPORALITY EFFECT IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
The temporal order effect has been demonstrated mostly for sequences 
of two non-everyday life events as the ones described above about games 
(e.g., Byrne et al., 2000; Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990; Spellman, 1997). 
However, most of research on causal primacy effect using mundane 
scenarios has been carried out using sequences that were longer than two 
events such as four events (e.g. Segura, Fernandez-Berrocal and Byrne, 
2002; Wells et al, 1987). Probably, these sequences are closer to the 
everyday life situations where people usually take in account more than two 
antecedents to an outcome.  
On the other hand, the number of events has been examined to be an 
important factor showed across studies focus on other domains like causal 
reasoning (e.g. as the number of pieces of information increases, beliefs are 
less sensitive to the impact of new information; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  
Hence, does the number of mundane antecedents affect perceived 
mutability in temporal sequences? Our first aim was to establish whether 
there is a temporal order effect in mundane situations that vary in the 
number of events occurring before an outcome. 
METHOD  
Materials and design. We presented three versions of a scenario in 
which a woman called Maria carried out some tasks before leaving the 
house and being involved in an accident. One of the versions of the scenario 
is presented here: 
Maria is a housewife. One morning, before going out, she put on the 
washing machine. Then, she drank a cup of coffee. Later, she ironed   S. Segura & R. McCloy 
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the clothes. Then, she read the newspaper. Following that, she made a 
phone call. Then, she made the beds. After that, she did the dishes. 
Later, she cleaned the fridge. Then, she made some sandwiches. When 
she left, she had an accident in the car.  
 
Maria thinks that she could have avoided the accident if she had not 
carried out some of the previous tasks, for example, if... 
 
There were three versions of this scenario in which the outcome was 
preceded by a different number of events: three (three-events condition), six 
(six-events condition) and nine (nine-events  condition). The nine 
antecedents were counterbalanced in the three cases. In all versions of the 
story, participants were asked to imagine how the situation could have been 
different. Hence, the dependent variable was the antecedent that participants 
chose to undo. 
 
Participants and Procedure. The 132 participants were 
undergraduate students from different departments in the University of 
Malaga, who took part in the experiment voluntarily.  They had not 
participated in such a study previously and they were tested in several 
groups. They were assigned randomly to the three-events condition (n= 42), 
the six-events condition (n=51), and the nine-events  condition (n= 39). 
Participants were given a booklet with the instructions (thanking them for 
taking part in the experiment and explaining to them that they had to answer 
one simple question after reading a situation),  as well as the story with the 
open question and a place to give the answer in separate pages. On 
completion of the experiment participants were verbally debriefed. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
We coded participants’ first responses by serial position (i.e., the 
position in the scenario held by that event). First responses that did not 
concern one of the nine target events were coded as others, and could not be 
scored for serial position. Results are presented in Table 1.   
 
Table 1: Percentage of participants first responses mentioning events in 
each position in Experiment 1. 
________________________________________________________________________
_  
      nine-events      six-events        three- events 
n         39             51    42 Counterfactuals and temporality effect 
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________________________________________________________________________
_  
Position                      
1 s t        8   6   19    
2nd       8   9   17    
3rd     10   17   29    
4th       3   6      
5th       3   9      
6th       5   18      
7th       5         
8th       8         
9th     26        
Others     24   35   35 
________________________________________________________________________
_  
 
Data were analysed by the hypothesis test for two proportions. Results 
showed a temporal order effect for the nine-events  condition (n = 39). 
Participants’ counterfactual thoughts focused on the last event (26%) more 
than on any of the other events [fourth and fifth events: 3% each; binomial, 
z = 3.01, p <0.001; sixth and seventh events: 5% each; binomial, z = 2.543, 
p <0.001; first, second and eighth event: 8% each; binomial, z = 2.83, p 
<0.01; and the third event: 10%; binomial, z = 1.738, p <0.05]. 
For  six-events condition, the highest percentage of counterfactual 
thoughts was found again for the last event (18%). Although this percentage 
was only significantly higher than the percentage of participants who 
mentioned the first and the fourth events (6% each; binomial, n = 51, z = 
1.785, p < 0.05). 
Finally, for the three-events condition, participants’ counterfactual 
thoughts focused mostly on the last event (29%). Although this percentage 
did not differ significantly from the percentage of participants that 
mentioned the second and first events (17% and 19%, respectively). 
The results indicate that, in mundane situations, there is a tendency to 
undo the last event in a temporal sequence. But this effect depends upon the 
number of antecedents events to an outcome: while there is not a temporal 
order effect for the three-events and the six-events conditions, the tendency 
is strong in the nine-events condition. 
Why is the case that for more mundane scenarios the temporal order 
effect needs a long sequence to occur and that is not necessary for the 
previous explored situations?  We suggest that, probably, real life situations 
(e.g. different activities which are neither related to each other nor related to 
a final result) are not always defined in terms of goals (e.g. wining a game   S. Segura & R. McCloy 
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which is defined by the result of each player). Hence, events are perceived 
as being independent, but do not seem to be in a sequence unless there are a 
sufficient amount of them (more than six events). The higher the number of 
events, the more likely people are to consider those events as part of such a 
sequence. Then, due to the limits of working memory, people do not 
represent all the different counterfactual possibilities of the scenario. 
Instead, they only construct a model of the situation where the first part of 
the information contextualises the model that they represent of the scenario, 
and that is the reason for them to undo the second part of such information. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
TEMPORAL ORDER EFFECT AND SOCIAL NORMS IN 
CONTERFACTUAL THINKING 
While there have been many efforts to elucidate the kinds of factors 
that can affect the mutability of events, there has to date been little 
systematic study of how the various factors interact (Gleicher, Kost, Baker, 
Strathman, Richman & Sherman, 1990; Vinokur & Ajzen, 1982). This 
current lack of understanding of how the myriad different factors that 
contribute to counterfactual mutability can be extended to those works that 
have looked for evidence for mutability effects in people’s real-life (e.g., 
Davis & Lehman, 1995), and that  may be why they find mixed results.  
A few studies have considered interactions between some of the 
mutability factors mentioned above, and have shown that the controllability 
effect is stronger than the temporal order effect (e.g. Girotto et al., 1991). 
We suggest that the temporal order effect may interact with factors that are 
related to social norms, and these norms play an important role in many real 
life situations.  
McCloy and Byrne (2000) showed that people are more likely to 
change inappropriate controllable events, which are exceptional with 
regards to interpersonal norms for behaviour, than to change appropriate 
controllable events, which are normal. They suggest that events can deviate 
from interpersonal norms along a number of different dimensions (e.g., 
perceived necessity, legality, selfishness).  
 The first aim of this study was to establish the effects of varying 
interpersonal normality on a unexplored dimension: selfishness. We 
predicted that controllable events which were selfish  (i.e., done purely for 
the self) would be more mutable than controllable events which were 
selfless  (i.e., done for more than just the self), because selfish events are 
exceptional with respect to interpersonal norms and selfless events are 
normal.  Counterfactuals and temporality effect 
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The second aim of this study was to explore the interaction between 
interpersonal normality and the temporal order effect. We predicted that the 
selfishness of an event would interact with its position in a temporal 
sequence, in that selfish events which occur last in an independent temporal 
sequence should be changed more often than selfish events which occur 
earlier. 
METHOD  
Materials and design. We use the same constructed scenario for the 
previous experiment describing a morning in the life of a woman (Maria). 
On this day, Maria carried out nine tasks before leaving the house. Of these, 
eight were everyday household tasks (e.g., dusting, ironing, washing 
clothes, sweeping, cleaning the fridge, making the beds, doing the dishes, 
making sandwiches) while one was an event carried out purely for Maria 
herself (reading a magazine). Within the group of eight, we did not include 
any of the other tasks from the previous study that could be considered to be 
done only for the self (e.g., making a phone call; drinking a cup of coffee). 
Moreover, the task consisting on  reading the newspaper was changed by 
reading a magazine, in order to make it very clear that it was something that 
Maria did for herself, because a person might read the newspaper for a 
number of non selfish reasons (for example: looking for a job or searching 
for emergency telephone numbers). The outcome of this scenario was again 
that on leaving the house Maria had a car accident. Participants were asked 
to imagine how the outcome might have been different if she had not done 
one of the tasks.  
The within-subjects variable was the nature of the tasks (selfish vs. 
selfless). The between-subjects variable was the position in which the 
selfish event appeared in the scenario. For one group the selfish event 
(reading a magazine) appeared in the first position in the scenario (the start 
condition). For a second group it appeared in the fifth position in the 
scenario (the middle condition) and for a third group it appeared in the ninth 
position in the scenario (the end condition). The position of the eight 
selfless events in the scenario was varied to control for event effects, so that 
each event appeared equally as often in each of the remaining eight 
positions in the scenario. Again, in all versions of the story, participants 
were asked to imagine a situation in which things had been different. Hence, 
the dependent variable was the antecedent that participants chose to undo. 
 
Participants and Procedure.  The participants were 117 
undergraduates from the University of Malaga, Spain.  They had not   S. Segura & R. McCloy 
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participated in such a study previously and they were tested in several 
groups. Participants were assigned at random to one of the three 
experimental conditions regarding the position of the selfish event (first, n = 
35; middle, n = 42; last, n = 40). They received a booklet with the 
instructions, the task and the open question as in experiment 1. On 
completion of the experiment, participants were also verbally debriefed. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this experiment, we additionally analysed the nature of the events 
that participants chose to undo (selfish or selfless). We therefore coded 
which of the nine events participants first responses to the mutation 
question focused on. First responses that did not concern one of the nine 
target events were again coded as others, and could not be scored. Results 
are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Percentage of participants first responses mentioning each of 
the target events in the scenario in Experiment 2. 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
    Start    Middle   End   Overall 
n      35             42    40    117 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Events   
Read magazine    31   19   40   30  
Clean fridge   11   14   3   9   
Make beds   3   7   3   4   
Sweeping floor   0   5   5   3   
Make sandwiches  3   5   3   3
  
Do  ironing   0   7   3   3   
Do dusting   3   0   5   3   
Wash dishes   3   0   3   2   
Washing machine  3   2   0   2  
Others     43   41   35   41 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
  Overall, participants first responses focused significantly more often 
on the selfish  event (reading a magazine; 30%) than on any of the selfless 
events (n = 117; see fourth column, Table 2). They undid it significantly 
more often than cleaning the fridge (9%; binomial, z = 3.54, p < 0.001), 
making the beds (4%; binomial, z = 4.74, p< 0.001), ironing, sweeping the Counterfactuals and temporality effect 
 
11 
floor, making sandwiches, dusting (3% each; binomial, z = 4.96, p < 0.001) 
washing the dishes and putting on the washing machine (2%, binomial,  z = 
5.43, p < 0.001). 
This pattern holds in the condition where the selfish event occurred at 
the start (n = 35) of the scenario (see first column, Table 2). Participants 
first responses undid the selfish  event, reading a magazine (31%), 
significantly more often than any of the selfless events in the scenario: 
cleaning the fridge (11%; binomial, z = 1.81, p < 0.05), making the beds, 
washing the dishes, putting on the washing machine, dusting, and making 
sandwiches (3% each; binomial, z = 2.89, p < 0.001), ironing, and sweeping 
the floor (0% each; binomial, z = 3.32, p < 0.001). 
It also holds in the condition where the selfish  event occurred at the 
end (n = 40) of the scenario (see third column, Table 2). Participants first 
responses focused more often on reading a magazine (40%) than on any of 
the other events: dusting, and sweeping the floor (5% each; binomial, z = 
3.30, p < 0.001), cleaning the fridge, making the beds, washing the dishes, 
ironing, and making sandwiches (3% each; binomial, z = 3.64, p < 0.001), 
and putting on the washing machine (0%; binomial, n = 16, z = 4.00, p < 
0.0001). 
However, the pattern is not the same for the condition where the 
selfish event is located in the middle (the fifth position) of the scenario (n = 
42; see second column, Table 2). Reading a magazine was once again the 
most common first response (19%). It was mentioned significantly more 
often than sweeping the floor and making sandwiches (5% each; binomial, z 
= 1.90, p < 0.03), putting on the washing machine (2%; binomial, z = 2.33, 
p < 0.01), washing the dishes, and dusting (0% each; binomial, z = 2.83, p < 
0.003). Although it was not mentioned significantly more often than 
cleaning the fridge (14%), making the beds or ironing (7% each). 
As predicted first, the selfish controllable event is more mutable than 
events than are selfless. We suggest that these results provide a replication 
of the effects of interpersonal  exceptionality, and that they extend this 
effect to events that deviate from prevailing interpersonal norms along an 
unexplored dimension, that of selfishness.  
Like in the previous experiment, we coded participants’ first 
responses by serial position. First responses that did not concern one of the 
nine target events were again coded as others, and could not be scored. 
Results are presented in Table 3.  
The effects of selfishness are strongest in the end condition where the 
selfish event appears in the last position in the scenario. Participants 
focussed significantly more often on this event when it was located at the 
end of the sequence (40%, n = 40) than when it was located at the middle   S. Segura & R. McCloy 
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(19%, n = 42, z = 2.090, p < 0.025), but not when the event was located at 
the  start (31%). In any case, the effects are considerably weaker in the 
middle condition (19%), where participants did not mention significantly 
the target event more often than in the start condition (31%). This suggests 
that the effects of selfishness and position in a temporal sequence interact in 
determining counterfactual mutability.  
As predicted, the results of the experiment also showed that the 
mutability of selfish events varies with their position in the scenario. Selfish 
events that occur last in an independent temporally ordered sequence are 
more mutable than those which occur in the middle of the sequence. 
However, the first event in this temporal sequence is also highly mutable. 
Why might this be the case? One suggestion is that this may be the result of 
two different tendencies - the tendency to undo the last event in a temporal 
sequence (e.g., Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990), and the tendency to undo the 
first event in a causal sequence (e.g., Wells et al., 1987). It is possible that 
some of our participants may have inferred that the events in the scenario 
formed a dependent causal sequence, rather than an independent temporal 
sequence, and that this may have resulted in them focusing on the first event 
in the sequence, rather than on the last. However, the results of the first 
experiment do not support this idea, because participants do not tend to 
undo the first event. A second possibility is that the results may reflect the 
relative availability of the events in memory (in terms of primacy and 
recency effects). Nevertheless, our interpretation of the results to the first 
experiment as well as that by Byrne and her colleagues (Byrne et al., 2000) 
leads us to ruled out an explanation of the temporal order effect in terms of 
recency effects, and hence they may not be enough to account for all of our 
results.   
 
Table 3: Percentage of participants first responses mentioning events in 
each position in the scenario in Experiment 2. 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
    Start   Middle   End   
n         35             42    40     
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Position                                         
1st     31   5   8    
2nd     0   5   5    
3rd     0   2   0    
4th     0   2   3    
5th     9   19   0     
6th     0   5   5    
7th     3   2   0    Counterfactuals and temporality effect 
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8th     11   7   3    
9th     3   12    40    
Others     43   41   36 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
We suggest an explanation of the present results in terms of social 
norms for behaviour that also affect the particular order in which these 
events should take place. The occurrence of the selfish event early in the 
scenario may violate people’s assumptions about when people normally 
carry out such actions. A selfish action carried out when there are selfless 
tasks waiting to be done may be seen as more exceptional than one carried 
out after the completion of such tasks. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Our first finding is that the temporal order effect, the tendency to undo 
the last event in a sequence of independent antecedents to an outcome, 
seems to depend on the number of antecedent events in everyday situations.  
We argue that, in real life, for temporal sequences, people often deal with 
chains of events that are much longer than just two events and usually goals 
are not so well defined. Therefore, the information that provides the 
cornerstone or anchor for the mental model’s foundation of the situation 
need to be composed by a sufficient amount of events for people to perceive 
the group of them as a sequence that affect an outcome.  
Our second finding is that the temporal order effect interacts with 
social norms. In everyday life, we face social situations that are defined by 
norms. These norms are not always explicit and they indicate to people 
about the behaviour they must follow if they want to belong to the group. 
These norms rule the everyday social world and they determine what is 
appropriate and what is not appropriate. Events can deviate from what is 
acceptable or appropriate in a dimension such as selfishness. People tend to 
mentally undo those events that are exceptional with respect to these norms, 
as when events are inappropriate (McCloy and Byrne, 2000) or they are 
selfish, as we have shown. 
People’s counterfactual thoughts following negative outcomes tend to 
be geared toward helping them avoid such outcomes in the future, so they 
tend to imagine how things could have been better (Roese & Olson, 1997) 
and those events which are more exceptional are more probable to be 
selected. The exceptional events are more deviated from the norms as 
commissions do not maintains the status quo compared to omissions in the 
action effect (Byrne & McEleney, 1997; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and   S. Segura & R. McCloy 
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they are more probable to be selected. A selfish event would be exceptional 
with respect to the social norm or what is appropriate. In addition, when this 
event happens in a temporal sequence is more mutable if it located in the 
last place.  
However, we found that people also tend to undo those selfish events 
that are located in first place. We suggest that rather than being a causal 
primacy effect (which does not happen in Experiment 1) it is another 
consequence of violating social norms for behaviour. There may be norms 
not only about which events deviate from the established codes of 
behaviour, but also the order in which those events should occur. Hence, a 
selfish event may be seen as more exceptional when it happens first in a 
sequence. In other words, there are social rules about the order of events 
that affect people’s thoughts when they imagine how things could have been 
different.  
In addition, these assumptions about norms have affective 
consequences like guilt  which is probably the most representative 
counterfactual emotion and clearly happens from violating social norms. 
Guilt is the result of a process that starts with an event that has negative 
consequences and involves judgements about blame and responsibility 
(Shaver, 1985). We suggest that the order in which this event happens also 
affect people’s attributions. We think that, for example, a person would feel 
guilty not only because she has carry out an action but also because this 
action was carried out first. In our scenario, Maria would regret and feel 
guilty not only for reading a magazine but also because she did it in first 
place before doing all her household chores and there are some implicit 
social norms about doing chores first.  
 
Conclusions. 
The temporal order effect has been demonstrated mainly for 
sequences of two events and using non-mundane scenarios. We found no 
effect in everyday life scenarios with less than six events, but we did find a 
clear temporal order effect for sequences of nine events. The explanation 
can be described, mostly, in terms of the amount of information that people 
need to consider when they are thinking about these everyday situations and 
the constraints of working memory. Future research should address the 
question of how many alternatives people naturally consider in 
counterfactual thinking. The concept of working memory may well play a 
central role in the future development of this area of cognitive psychology 
(Richardson, Engle, Hasher, Logie, Stoltzfus, & Zacks, 1996), and the 
effects of mental load in general on counterfactual thinking may be a 
promising future area of research (Kahneman, 1995).  Counterfactuals and temporality effect 
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We have also showed that there is an interaction between this 
temporal order effect and other factors, such as interpersonal norms. These 
norms form the basis of everyday social situations and they can also act to 
constrain counterfactual thinking. Specifically, events that are selfish, are 
considered to be more mutable than those ones which are selfless and 
particularly when they are located in the last position in a nine event 
sequence. Selfishness is maybe related to emotions like guilt. Future 
research should consider the interaction of factors that determine thinking 
about what might have been in everyday circumstances considering social 
norms of behaviour, including studies across cultures. The understanding of 
the role of social norms would help to explore the consequences that   
counterfactual thinking has on attributions of causality, and emotions such 
as guilt, blame, and regret.  
RESUMEN 
Razonamiento  contrafáctico en situaciones de la vida diaria: Efectos de 
orden temporales y normas sociales. El razonamiento contrafáctico es la 
comparación de una situación fáctica con una alternativa simulada. Cuando 
las personas imaginan cómo las cosas podrían haber sido diferentes, tienden 
a deshacer mentalmente el último suceso de una secuencia de 
acontecimientos independientes previos a un resultado. Se presentan dos 
experimentos que examinan este fenómeno que ha sido denominado el 
efecto de orden temporal. El primer experimento, con 132 participantes, 
examinó el efecto de variar el número de eventos de la vida diaria en el 
efecto de orden temporal. Los resultados muestran que en situaciones   
cotidianas, es necesario un número suficiente de sucesos para que efecto se 
produzca. El segundo experimento, con 177 participantes, examinó una 
posible relación entre el efecto de orden temporal con un efecto diferente: la 
tendencia a cambiar eventos controlables que son excepcionales respecto a 
las normas interpersonales de conducta. Los resultados muestran que la 
posición en una secuencia temporal de sucesos independientes afecta a la  
facilidad para cambiar esos eventos excepcionales. Los resultados se 
discuten en términos de normas sociales. 
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